Herein is set forth
the Question, concerning the Two Divine Permissions
which God justly allows, namely, that the Devil, the
Author or all Evil, should Sin, and that our First
Parents should Fall, from which Origins the Works of
Witches are justly suffered to take place.
The
second question and proposition is that God justly
permitted certain Angels to sin in deed, which He could
not have allowed unless they were capable of sin; and
that in like manner He preserved certain creatures
through grace, without their having previously suffered
temptation; and that He justly allows man both to be
tempted and to sin. And all this is clearly shown as
follows. For it is a part of Divine providence that each
single thing should be left to its own nature, and not
be altogether impeded in its natural works. For, as
Dionysius says (de Diuin. Nom., IV), Providence
is not a destroyer, but a preserver of nature. This
being so, it is manifest that, just as the good of the
race is better than the good of the individual
(Aristotle, Ethics, I), so also the good of the
universe takes precedence over the good of any
particular creature. Therefore we must add that, if men
were prevented from sinning, many steps to perfection
would be removed. For that nature would be removed which
has it in its power to sin or not to sin; but it has
already been shown that this is a natural property of
man's nature.
And let it be
answered that, if there had been no sin, but immediate
confirmation, then there would never have appeared what
debt of grace in good works is due to God, and what the
power of sin has been able to effect, and many other
things without which the universe would suffer great
loss. For it behoved that Satan should sin, not through
some outside suggestion, but that he should find in
himself the occasion of sin. And this he did when he
wished to be equal to God. Now this is to be understood
neither simply and directly, nor indirectly, but only
with a reservation; and this is declared according to
the authority of Esaias xiv: I will ascend above
the heights of the clouds; I will be like the Most High.
For it must not be understood simply and directly,
because in that case he would have had a limited and
erring understanding, in seeking something which was
impossible for him. For he knew that he was a creature
created by God, and therefore he knew that it was
impossible for him to become equal to his Creator.
Neither, again, must it be understood indirectly; for
since the whole transparence of the air consists in its
subjection to the sun's rays; therefore nothing which
would be contrary to the good of its nature could be
sought for by an Angel. But he sought for equality with
God, not absolutely, but with a reservation, which was
as follows. The nature of God has two qualities, that of
blessedness and goodness, and the fact that all the
blessedness and goodness of His creatures issues from
Him. Therefore the Angel, seeing that the dignity of his
own nature transcended that of the other creatures,
wished and asked that the blessedness and goodness of
all the inferior creatures should be derived from him.
And he sought this in his own natural capacity, that
just as he was the first to be endowed in nature with
those qualities, so the other creatures should receive
them from the nobility of his nature. And he sought this
of God, in perfect willingness to remain subject to God
so long as he had that power granted to him. Therefore
he did not wish to be made equal with God absolutely,
but only with a reservation.
It is further
to be noted that, wishing to bring his desire to the
point of action, he suddenly made it known to others;
and the understanding of the other Angels of his desire,
and their perverse consenting to it, was also sudden.
Therefore the sin of the First Angel exceeded and
preceded the sins of the others in respect of the
magnitude of his guilt and causality, but not in respect
of duration. See Apocalypse xii. The dragon
falling from heaven drew with him the third part of the
stars. And he lives in the form of Leviathan, and is
king over all the children or pride. And, according to
Aristotle (Metaph., V), he is called king of
princes, inasmuch as he moves those who are subject to
him according to his will and command. Therefore his sin
was the occasion of sin in others, since he first, not
having been tempted from outside, was the external
temptation of others.
And that all
these things happened instantaneously may be exemplified
by physical things; for the ignition of a gas, the sight
of the flame, and the impression formed by that sight
all happen at one and the same time.
I have put
this matter at some length; for in the consideration of
that stupendous Divine permission in the case of the
most noble creatures with regard to the one sin of
ambition, it will be easier to admit particular
permissions in the case of the works of witches, which
are in some certain circumstances even greater sins. For
in certain circumstances the sins of witches are greater
than that of the Angel or of our first parents, as will
be shown in the Second Part.
Now the fact
that the providence of God permitted the first man to be
tempted and to sin is sufficiently clear from what has
been said concerning the transgression of the Angels.
For both man and the Angel were created to the same end,
and left with free-will, in order that they might
receive the reward of blessedness not without merit.
Therefore, just as the Angel was not preserved from his
fall, in order that the power of sin on the one side and
the power of the confirmation of grace on the other side
might work together for the glory of the universe, so
also ought it to be considered in the case of man.
Wherefore S.
Thomas (II, 23, art. 2) says: That by which God is
glorified ought not to be hindered from within. But God
is glorified in sin, when He pardons in mercy and when
He punishes in justice; therefore it behoves Him not to
hinder sin. Let us, then, return to a brief
recapitulation of our proposition, namely, that by the
just providence of God man is permitted to sin for many
reasons. First, that the power of God may be shown, Who
alone is unchanging while every creature is variable.
Secondly, that the wisdom of God may be declared, Who
can bring good out of evil, which could not be unless
God had allowed the creature to sin. Thirdly, that the
mercy of God may be made manifest, by which Christ
through His death liberated man who was lost. Fourthly,
that the justice of God may be shown, which not only
rewards the good, but also punishes the wicked. Fifthly,
that the condition of man may not be worse than that of
other creatures, all of whom God so governs that He
allows them to act after their own nature; wherefore it
behoved Him to leave man to his own judgement. Sixthly,
for the glory of men; that is, the glory of the just man
who could transgress but has not. And seventhly, for the
adorning of the universe; for as there is a threefold
evil in sin, namely, guilty, pain, and loss, so is the
universe adorned by the corresponding threefold good,
namely, righteousness, pleasure, and usefulness. For
righteousness is adorned by guilt, pleasure by pain, and
all usefullness by loss. And by this the answer to the
arguments is made plain. Solutions to the
Arguments.
According to the first argument it is heretical to
maintain that the devil is allowed power to injure men.
But the opposite appears rather to be true; for it is
heretical to assert that God does not permit man, of his
own free-will, to sin when he wishes. And God permits
much sin, by reason of His power to hurt men in the
punishment of the wicked for the adorning of the
universe. For it is said by S. Augustine in his Book
of Soliloques: Thou, Lord, hast commanded, and it is
so, that the shame of guilt should never be without the
glory of punishment.
And that is
not a valid proof of the argument which is taken from
the wise ruler who keeps away all defect and evil as far
as he can. For it is quite different with God, Who has
an universal care, from one who has only a particular
care. For God, Whose care is universal, can bring good
out of evil, as is shown by what has been said.
For the
second argument, it is clear that God's power as well as
His goodness and justice are manifest in His permission
of sin. So when it is argued that God either can or
cannot prevent evil, the answer is that He can prevent
it, but that for the reasons already shown it does not
behove Him to do so.
Neither is it
valid to object that He therefore wishes evil to be;
since He can prevent it but will not; for, as has been
shown in the arguments for the truth, God cannot wish
evil to be. He neither wishes nor does not wish it, but
He permits it for the perfecting of the universe.
In the third
argument S. Augustine and Aristotle are quoted on the
subject of human knowledge, saying that it is better for
a man not to have knowledge of that which is evil and
vile for two reasons: first, that then he will have less
opportunity to think of evil, since we cannot understand
many things at the same time. And secondly, because
knowledge of evil sometimes perverts the will towards
evil. But these arguments do not concern God, Who
without and detriment understands all the deeds of men
and of witches.
For the
fourth argument: S. Paul excepts the care of God from
oxen, to show that a rational creature has through
free-will command over its actions, as has been said.
Therefore God has a special providence over him, that
either blame or merit may be imputed to him, and he may
receive either punishment or reward; but that God does
not in this way care for the irrational beasts.
But to argue
from that authority that the individuals of irrational
creation have no part in Divine providence would be
heretical; for it would be to maintain that all things
are not subject to Divine providence, and would be
contrary to the praise which is spoken in Holy Scripture
concerning the Divine wisdom, which stretches mightily
from end to end and disposes all things well; and it
would be the error of the Rabbi Moses as was shown in
the arguments for the truth.
For the fifth
argument, man did not institute nature, but puts the
works of nature to the greatest use known to his skill
and strength. Therefore human providence does not extend
to the inevitable phenomena of nature, as that the sun
will rise to-morrow. But God's providence does extend to
these things, since He is Himself the author of nature.
Wherefore also defects in nature, even if they arise out
of the natural course of things, are subject to Divine
providence. And therefore Democritus and the other
natural philosophers were in error when they ascribed
whatever happened to the inferior creation to the mere
chance of matter.
For the last
argument: although every punishment is inflicted by God
for sin, yet the greatest sinners are not always
afflicted with witchcraft. And this may be because the
devil does not wish to afflict and tempt those whom he
sees to belong to him by just title, or because he does
not wish them to be turned back to God. As it is said:
Their plagues were multiplied, and they turned them to
God, etc. And that all punishment is inflicted by God
for sin is shown by what follows; for according to S.
Jerome: Whatever we suffer, we deserve for our sins.
Now it is
declared that the sins of witches are more grievous than
those of the bad angels and our first parents.
Wherefore, just as the innocent are punished for the
sins of their fathers, so are many blameless people
damned and bewitched for the sins of witches.
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