Whether the
Permission of Almighty God is an Accompaniment of
Witchcraft.
Now
we must consider the Divine permission itself, touching
which four things are asked. First, whether it is
necessary that this permission should accompany a work
of witchcraft. Secondly, that God in His justice permits
a creature naturally sinful to perpetrate witchcraft and
other horrid crimes, the other two necessary
concomitants being presupposed. Thirdly, that the crime
of witchcraft exceeds all other evils which God permits
to be done. Fourthly, in what way this matter should be
preached to the people.
Concerning
the third postulate of this First Part, namely, the
Divine permission, it is asked: Whether it is as
Catholic to affirm the Divine permission in these works
of witches, as it is quite heretical to contradict such
an affirmation? And it is argued that it is not
heretical to maintain that God does not permit so great
power to the devil in this sort of witchcraft. For it is
Catholic, and not heretical, to refute such things as
appear to be to the disparagement of the Creator. And it
is submitted that it is Catholic to maintain that the
devil is not allowed such power of injuring men, since
to hold the opposite opinion seems to be a disparagement
of the Creator. For it would then follow that not
everything is subject to the Divine providence, since
the all-wise Provider keeps away, as far as possible,
all defect and evil from those for whom He cares. And if
the works of witchcraft are permitted by God, they are
not kept away by Him: and if He does not keep them away,
the God Himself is not a wise Provider, and all things
are not subject to His providence. But since this is
false, therefore it is false that God permits
witchcraft.
And again, to
permit a thing to happen presupposes in him who permits
it that either he can prevent it from happening if he
wishes, or he cannot prevent it even if he wishes; and
neither of these suppositions can apply to God. For in
the first case, such a man would be thought spiteful,
and in the second case impotent. Then it is incidentally
asked: As to that bewitchment that happened to Peter, if
God could have prevented it, and did not do so, then God
is either despiteful or He does not care for all; but if
He could not have prevented it even if He wished, the He
is not omnipotent. But since it is not possible to
maintain the opinion that God does not care for all, and
the rest, therefore it cannot be said that witchcraft is
done with the permission of God.
Besides, he
who is responsible to himself and is the master of his
own actions is not subject to the permission or
providence of any governor. But men were made
responsible to themselves by God, according to Ecclesiasticus
xv: God made man from the beginning, and left him in the
hand of his counsel. In particular, the sins which men
do are left in their own counsel, according to their
hearts' desire. Therefore not all evils are subject to
Divine permission.
Yet again, S.
Augustine says in the Enchiridion, as does also
Aristotle in the ninth book of Metaphysics: It is
better not to know certain vile things than to know
them, but all that is good is to be ascribed to God.
Therefore God does not prevent the very vile works of
witchcraft, whether He permits or not. See also S. Paul
in I. Corinthians ix: Doth God take care of oxen?
And the same holds good of the other irrational beasts.
Wherefore God takes no care whether they are bewitched
or not, since they are not subject to His permission,
which proceeds from His providence.
Again, that
which happens of necessity has no need of provident
permission or prudence. This is clearly shown in
Aristotle's Ethics, Book II: Prudence is a right
reasoning concerning things which happen and are subject
to counsel and choice. But several effects of witchcraft
happen of necessity; as when for some reason, or owing
to the influence of stars, diseases come, or any other
things which we judge to be witchcraft. Therefore they
are not always subject to Divine permission.
And again, if
men are bewitched by Divine permission, then it is
asked: Why does this happen to one more than to another?
If it be said that it is because of sin, which abounds
more in one than in another, this does not seem valid;
for then the greater sinners would be the more
bewitched, but this is manifestly not so, since they are
less punished in this world. As it is said: Well is it
for the liars. But, if this argument were good, they
also would be bewitched. Finally, it is clear from the
fact that innocent children and other just men suffer
most from witchcraft.
But against
these arguments: it is submitted that God permits evil
to be done, though He does not wish it; and this is for
the perfecting of the universe. See Dionysius, de
Diuin. Nom. III: Evil will be for all time, even to
the perfecting of the universe. And S. Augustine in the Enchiridion:
In all things good and evil consists the admirable
beauty of the universe. So that what is said to be evil
is well ordained, and kept in its due place commends
more highly that which is good; for good things are more
pleasing and laudable when compared with bad. S. Thomas
also refutes the opinion of those who say that, although
God has no wish for evil (since no creature seeks for
evil, either in its natural, or its animal, or in its
intellectual appetite, which is the will, whose object
is good), yet He is willing that evil should exist and
be done. This he says to be false; since God neither
wishes evil to be done, nor wishes it not to be done,
but is willing to allow evil to be done; and this is
good for the perfecting of the universe.
And why it is
erroneous to say that God wishes evil to be and to be
done, for the good of the universe, he says is for the
following reason. Nothing is to be judged good except
what is good in itself and not by accident. As the
virtuous man is judge good in his intellectual nature,
not in his animal nature. But evil is not of itself
ordained for good, but by accident. For against the
intention of those who do evil, good results. In this
way, against the intention of witches, or against the
intention of tyrants, was it that through their
persecutions the patience of the martyrs shone out
clearly.
Answer.
This question is as difficult to understand as it is
profitable to elucidate. For there is among the
arguments, not so much of Laymen as of certain Wise men,
this in common; that they do not believe that such
horrible witchcraft as had been spoken of is permitted
by God; being ignorant of the causes of this Divine
permission. And by reason of this ignorance, since
witches are not put down with the vengeance that is due
to them, they seem now to be depopulating the whole of
Christianity. Therefore that both learned and unlearned
may be satisfied in each way, according to the opinion
of the Theologians, we make our answer by the discussion
of two difficulties. And first, that he world is so
subject to the Divine providence that He Himself
provides for all. Secondly, that in His justice He
permits the prevalence of sin, which consists of guilt,
punishment, and loss, by reason of His two first
permissions, namely, the fall of the Angels and that of
our first parents. From which also it will be clear that
obstinately to disbelieve this smacks of heresy, since
such a man implicates himself in the errors of the
infidels.
And as for
the first, it is to be noted that, presupposing that
which pertains to the providence of God (see Wisdom
xiv: Thy providence, O Father, governeth all things), we
ought also to maintain that all things are subject to
His providence, and that also He immediately provides
for all things. And to make this clear, let us first
refute a certain contrary error. For taking the text in Job
xxii: Thick clouds are a covering to him that He seeth
not us; and He walketh in the circuit of heaven: some
have thought that the doctrine pf S. Thomas, I, 22,
means that only incorruptible things are subject to
Divine providence, such as the separate Essences, and
the stars, with also the species of lower things, which
are also incorruptible; but they said that the
individuals of the species, being corruptible, were not
so subject. Wherefore they said that all lower things
which are in the world are subject to Divine providence
in the universal, but not in the particular or
individual sense. But to others this opinion did not
seem tenable, since God cares for the other animals just
as He does for men. Therefore the Rabbi Moses, wishing
to hold a middle course, agreed with their opinion in
saying that all corruptible things are not individually
entirely subject to Divine governance, but only in a
universal sense, as has been said before; but he
excepted men from the generality of corruptible things,
because of the splendid nature of their intellect, which
is comparable with the of the separate Essences. And so,
according to his opinion, whatever witchcraft happens to
men comes from the Divine permission; but not such as
happens to the animals or to the other fruits of the
earth.
Now though
this opinion is nearer to the truth than that which
altogether denies the providence of God in worldly
matters, maintaining that the world was made by chance,
as did Democritus and the Epicureans, yet it is not
without great fallacy. For it must be said that
everything is subject to Divine providence, not only in
the general, but also in the particular sense; and that
the bewitching not only of men, but also of animals and
the fruits of the earth, comes from Divine and provident
permission. And this is plainly true; the providence and
ordinance of things to some end extend just so far as
the causality of them itself extends. To take an example
from things that are subject to some master; they are so
far subject to his providence as they are themselves
under his control. But the causality which is of God is
the original agent, and extends itself to all beings,
not only in a general but also in an individual sense,
and not only to things incorruptible. Therefore, since
all things must be of God, so all things are cared for
by Him, that is, are ordained to some end.
This point is
touched by S. Paul in Romans xiii: All things
which are from God were ordained by Him. Which is to say
that, just as all things come from God, so also are all
things ordained by Him, and are consequently subject to
His providence. For the providence of God is to be
understood as nothing else than the reason, that is, the
cause of the ordering of things to a purpose. Therefore,
in so far as all things are a part of one purpose, so
also are they subject to the providence of God. And God
knows all things, not only in the mass generally, but
also in the individual particularly. Now the knowledge
which God has of things created is to be compared with a
craftsman's knowledge of his work: therefore, just as
all his work is subject to the order and providence of a
craftsman, so are all things subject to the order and
providence of God.
But this does
not provide a satisfactory explanation of the fact that
God in justice permits evil and witchcraft to be in the
world, although He is Himself the provider and governor
of all things; for it would seem that, if this is
conceded, He ought to keep away all evil from those for
whom He cares. For we see among men that a wise provider
does all that he can to keep away all defect and harm
from those who are his care; therefore why does not God,
in the same way, keep away all evil? It must be noted
that a particular and an universal controller or
provider are two very different matters. For the
particular controller must of necessity keep away all
the harm he can, since he is not able to extract good
out of evil. But God is the universal controller of the
whole world, and can extract much good from particular
evils; as through the persecution of the tyrants came
the patience of the martyrs, and through the works of
witches come the purgation or proving of the faith of
the just, as will be shown. Therefore it is not God's
purpose to prevent all evil, lest the universe should
lack the cause of much good. Wherefore S. Augustine says
in the Enchiridion: So merciful is Almighty God,
that He would not allow any evil to be in His works
unless He were so omnipotent and good that He can bring
good even out of evil.
And we have
an example of this in the actions of natural things. For
although the corruptions and defects which occur in
natural things are contrary to the purpose of that
particular thing (as when a thief is hanged, or when
animals are killed for human food), they are yet in
accordance with the universal purpose of nature (as that
man's life and property should be kept intact); and thus
the universal good is preserved. For it is necessary for
the conservation of the species that the death of one
should be the preservation of another. For lions are
kept alive by the slaughter of other animals.
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