In Which Various
Doubts are Set Forth with Regard to the Foregoing
Questions and Negative Answers. Whether the Accused is
to be Imprisoned, and when she is to be considered
Manifestly Taken in the Foul Heresy of Witchcraft. This
is the Second Action
It
is asked first what is to be done when, as often
happens, the accused denies everything. We answer that
the Judge has three points to consider, namely, her bad
reputation, the evidence of the fact, and the words of
the witnesses; and he must see whether all these agree
together. And if, as very often is the case, they do not
altogether agree together, since witches are variously
accused of different deeds committed in some village or
town; but the evidences of the fact are visible to the
eye, as that a child has been harmed by sorcery, or,
more often, a beast has been bewitched or deprived of
its milk; and it a number of witnesses have come forward
whose evidence, even if it show certain discrepancies
(as that one should say she had bewitched his child,
another his beast, and a third should merely witness to
her reputation, and so with the others), but
nevertheless agree in the substance of the fact, that
is, as to the witchcraft, and that she is suspected of
being a witch; although those witnesses are not enough
to warrant a conviction without the fact of the general
report, or even with that fact, as was shown above at
the end of Question III, yet, taken in conjunction with
the visible and tangible evidence of the fact, the Judge
may, in consideration of these three points together,
decide that the accused is to be reputed, not as
strongly or gravely under suspicion (which suspicions
will be explained later), but as manifestly taken in the
heresy of witchcraft; provided, that is, that the
witnesses are of a suitable condition and have not given
evidence out of enmity, and that a sufficient number of
them, say six or eight or ten, have agreed together
under oath. And then, according to the Canon Law, he
must subject her to punishment, whether she has
confessed her crime or not. And this is proved as
follows.
For since it
is said, that when all three of the above considerations
are in agreement, then she should be thought to be
manifestly taken in heresy, it must not be understood
that it is necessary for all three to be in agreement,
but only that if this is the case the proof is all the
stronger. For either one instance by itself of the
following two circumstances, namely, the evidence of the
fact and the production of legitimate witnesses, is
sufficient to cause a person to be reputed as manifestly
taken in heresy; and all the more when both these
considerations are in agreement.
For when the
Jurists ask in how many ways a person may be considered
as manifestly taken in heresy, we answer that there are
three ways, as S. Bernard has explained. This matter was
treated of above in the First Question at the beginning
of this work, namely, the evidence of the fact, when a
person has publicly preacher heresy. But here we
consider the evidence of the fact provided by public
threats uttered by the accused, as when she said, “You
shall have no healthy days,” or some such thing, and
the threatened effect has followed. The other two ways
are the legitimate proof of the case by witnesses, and
thirdly by her own confession. Therefore, if each of
these singly is sufficient to cause a person to be
manifestly suspected, how much more is this the case
when the reputation of the accused, the evidence of the
fact, and the depositions of witnesses all together
point to the same conclusion. It is true that S. Bernard
speaks of an evident fact, and we here speak of the
evidence of the fact; but this is because the devil does
not work openly, but secretly. Therefore the injuries
and the instruments of witchcraft which are found
constitute the evidence of the fact. And whereas in
other heresies an evident fact is alone sufficient, here
we join three proofs together.
Secondly, it
is thus proved that a person so taken is to be punished
according to the law, even though she denies the
accusation. For a person taken on the evidence of the
fact, or on the depositions of witnesses, either
confesses the crime or does not. If he confesses and is
impenitent, he is to be handed over to the secular
courts to suffer the extreme penalty, according to the
chapter ad abolendam, or he is to be imprisoned
for life, according to the chapter excommunicamus.
But if he does not confess, and stoutly maintains his
denial, he is to be delivered as an impenitent to the
power of the Civil Court to be punished in a fitting
manner, as Henry of Segusio shows in his Summa,
where he treats of the manner of proceeding against
heretics.
It is
therefore concluded that it is most just if the Judge
proceeds in that manner with his questions and the
depositions of witnesses, since, as has been said, he
can in a case concerning the Faith conduct matters quite
plainly and in a short and summary manner; and it is
meet that he should consign the accused to prison for a
time, or for several years, in case perhaps, being
depressed after a year of the squalor of prison, she may
confess her crimes.
But, lest it
should seem that he arrives at his sentence
precipitately, and to show that he proceeds with all
equity, let us inquire into what should next be done.
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