Of Common
Purgation, and especially of the Trial of Red-hot Iron,
to which Witches Appeal
THE
question is now asked whether the secular judge may
allow a witch to be submitted to a common purgation
(concerning which see the Canon 2, q. 4, consuluisti,
and cap. monomachiam), in the manner in which a
civil defendant is allowed the trial by ordeal, as, for
example, that by red-hot iron. And it may seem that he
may do so.
For trial by
combat is allowable in a criminal case for the
protection of life, and in a civil case for the
protection of property; then wherefore not the trial by
red-hot iron or boiling water? S. Thomas allows that the
former is permissible in some cases, when he says in the
last article of the Second of the Second, q. 95,
that a duel is lawful when it appears to be consonant
with commonsense. Therefore the trial by red-hot iron
should also be lawful in some cases.
Also it has
been used by many Princes of saintly life who have
availed themselves of the advice and counsel of good
men; as, for example, the Sainted Emperor Henry in the
case of the virgin Cunegond whom he had married, who was
suspected of adultery.
Again, a
judge, who is responsible for the safety of the
community, may lawfully allow a smaller evil that a
greater may be avoided; as he allows the existence of
harlots in towns in order to avoid a general confusion
of lust. For S. Augustine On Free Will says: Take
away the harlots, and you will create a general chaos
and confusion of lust. So, when a person has been loaded
with insults and injuries by any community, he can clear
himself of any criminal or civil charge by means of a
trial by ordeal.
Also, since
less hurt is caused to the hands by the red-hot iron
than is the loss of life in a duel, if a duel is
permitted where such things are customary, much more
should the trial by red-hot iron be allowed.
But the
contrary view is argued where it says (2, q. 5, monomachiam)
that they who practice such and similar things appear to
be tempting God. And here the Doctors affirm it must be
noted that, according to S. Paul (I. Thessalonians
v), we must abstain, not only from evil, but from all
appearance of evil. Therefore the Canon says in that
chapter, not that they who use such practices tempt God,
but that they appear to tempt Him, so that it may be
understood that, even if a man engage in such a trial
with none but good intentions, yet since it has the
appearance of evil, it is to be avoided.
I answer that
such tests or trials are unlawful for two reasons.
First, because their purpose is to judge of hidden
matters of which it belongs only to God to judge.
Secondly, because there is no Divine authority for such
trials, nor are they anywhere sanctioned in the writings
of the Holy Fathers. And it says in the chapter
consuluisti, 2, q. 5: That which is not sanctioned in
the writings of the Sainted Fathers is to be presumed
superstitious. And Pope Stephen in the same chapter
says: It is left to your judgement to try prisoners who
are convicted by their own confession or the proofs of
the evidence; but leave that which is hidden and unknown
to Him Who alone knows the hearts of men.
There is,
nevertheless, a difference between a duel and the trial
by red-hot iron or boiling water. For a duel appears to
be more humanly reasonable, the combatants being of
similar strength and skill, than a trial by red-hot
iron. For although the purpose of both is to search out
something hidden by means of a human act; yet in the
case of trial by red-hot iron a miraculous effect is
looked for, whereas this is not so in the case of a
duel, in which all that can happen is the death of
either, or both, of the combatants. Therefore the trial
by red-hot iron is altogether unlawful; though a duel is
not illegal to the same extent. So much has been
incidentally admitted in respect of duels, on account of
Princes and secular Judges.
It is to be
noted that, because of those words of S. Thomas which
make the above distinction, Nicolas of Lyra, in his
Commentary on the duel or combat between David and
Goliath, I. Regum xvii, tried to prove that in
some cases a duel is lawful. But Paul of Burgos proves
that not this, but rather the opposite was the meaning
of S. Thomas; and all Princes and secular Judges ought
to pay particular attention to his proof.
His first
point is that a duel, like the other trial by ordeal,
has as its purpose the judgement of something hidden,
which ought to be left to the judgement of God, as we
have said. And it cannot be said that this combat of
David is an authority for duelling; for it was revealed
to him by the Lord through some inner instinct that he
must engage in that combat and avenge upon the
Philistine the injuries done against God, as is proved
by David's words: I come against thee in the name of the
living God. So he was not properly speaking a duellist,
but he was an executor of Divine justice.
His second
point is that Judges must especially note that in a duel
power, or at least licence, is given to each of the
parties to kill the other. But since one of them is
innocent, that power of licence is given for the killing
of an innocent man; and this is unlawful, as being
contrary to the dictates of natural law and to the
teaching of God. Therefore, a duel is altogether
unlawful, not only on the part of the appellant and the
respondent, but also on the part of the Judge and his
advisers, who are all equally to be considered homicides
or parties to manslaughter.
Thirdly, he
points out that a duel is a single combat between two
men, the purpose of which is that the justice of the
case should be made clear by the victory of one party,
as if by Divine judgement, notwithstanding the fact that
one of the parties is fighting in an unjust cause; and
in this way God is tempted. Therefore it is unlawful on
the part both of the appellant and the respondent. But
considering the fact that the judges have other means of
arriving at an equitable and just termination of the
dispute, when they do not use such means, but advise or
even permit a duel when they could forbid it, they are
consenting to the death of an innocent person.
But since it
is unlikely that Nicolas the Commentator was unaware or
ignorant of the above reasoning, it is concluded that,
when he says that in some cases a duel can be fought
without mortal sin, he is speaking on the part of the
Judges or advisers, namely, in a case when such a trial
is undertaken, not on their responsibility or advice,
but purely on that of the appellant and respondent
themselves.
But since it
is not our purpose to linger over and debate such
considerations, but to return to the question of
witches, it is clear that, if this sort of trial is
forbidden in the case of other criminal causes, such as
theft or robbery, still more must it be forbidden in the
case of witches who, it is agreed, obtain all their
power from the devil, whether it be for causing or
curing an injury, for removing or for preventing an
effect of witchcraft.
And it is not
wonderful witches are able to undergo this trial by
ordeal unscathed with the help of devils; for we learn
from naturalists that if the hands be anointed with the
juice of a certain herb they are protected from burning.
Now the devil has an exact knowledge of the virtues of
such herbs: therefore, although he can cause the hand of
the accused to be protected from the red-hot iron by
invisibly interposing some other substance, yet he can
procure the same effect by the use of natural objects.
Hence even less that other criminals ought witches to be
allowed this trial by ordeal, because their intimate
familiarity with the devil; and from the very fact of
their appealing to this trial they are to be held as
suspected witches.
An incident
illustrative of our argument occurred hardly three years
ago in the Diocese of Constance. For in the territory of
the Counts of Fuerstenberg and the Black Forest there
was a notorious witch who had been the subject of much
public complaint. At last, as the result of a general
demand, she was seized by the Count and accused of
various evil works of witchcraft. When she was being
tortured and questioned, wishing to escape from their
hands, she appealed to the trial by red-hot iron; and
the Count, being you and inexperienced, allowed it. And
she then carried the red-hot iron not only for the
stipulated three paces, but for six, and offered to
carry it even farther. Then, although they ought to have
taken this as manifest proof that she was a witch (since
one of the Saints dared to tempt the help of God in this
manner), she was released from her chains and lives to
the present time, not without grave scandal to the Faith
in those parts.
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